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Neutrality, autonomy, and power
Eldar Sarajlić*
Department of Academic Literacy and Linguistics, Borough of Manhattan Community
College, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA
This paper critically examines Alan Patten’s theory of neutrality of
treatment. It argues that the theory assumes an inadequate conception of
personal autonomy, which undermines its plausibility. However, I suggest
that the theory can resolve the problem by developing and reinterpreting
its conception of autonomy and introducing an additional strategy for
addressing the power imbalances that result from the market-based interac-
tions between individuals and their conceptions of the good.
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Introduction
In his book Equal Recognition, Alan Patten outlines a theory of liberal neutral-
ity he calls the neutrality of treatment (2014, pp. 104–149; henceforth ER).
The theory implies two important claims: ﬁrst, that liberal neutrality is
grounded in the value of personal autonomy, and second, that the proper real-
ization of the principle of liberal neutrality involves government’s extension of
neutral treatment to all individuals with different conceptions of the good.
According to Patten, this theory of neutrality offers a better way to conceptual-
ize the principle than the competing versions, which focus on effects and
intentions.
In this article I wish to critically examine Patten’s approach. In particular, I
will focus on the following question: what conception of autonomy is at play
in Patten’s theory, and is that conception able to account for the ways in which
personal commitments are constrained by hidden forms of social power and
inﬂuence? Although Patten offers a compelling argument for neutrality of
treatment, I think that there is a gap in the theory that needs to be addressed.
Personal autonomy: procedural or substantial?
Neither in the book, nor in the article that preceded it, does Patten provide us
with sufﬁcient details of his understanding of autonomy (see Patten, 2012,
pp. 249–272). Though it bears an important function in his theory, it is merely
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implied rather than elaborated. Yet, establishing what kind of understanding of
autonomy underpins this theoretical attempt is of crucial importance for assess-
ing its overall plausibility. Therefore, we have to interpret our way around and
see what theory of autonomy is at work in Patten’s neutrality of treatment
concept.
To see the rough sketches of his understanding of autonomy, we ﬁrst need
to determine what kind of importance he attaches to it within the broader
benchmarks of his theory. One could conclude from his idea of the fair base-
line that self-determination is important because it enables us to establish
responsibility and a fair distribution of labor between institutions and individu-
als. According to the idea of the fair baseline, once the state satisﬁes the back-
ground conditions individuals are responsible for the relative success of their
personal commitments. If a particular commitment is unsuccessful against a
background of fair opportunity for self-determination, the institutions are not
responsible for that, and the individual has no ground for a neutrality violation
complaint (ER, p. 18).
The idea of the fair baseline is further speciﬁed by additional strategies,
privatization, generic entanglement and evenhandedness. Their purpose is to
satisfy certain needs for generic types of goods all individuals require, and to
provide appropriate compensation to those left empty-handed by provisions
beneﬁting others. But, the crucial aim of the baseline is to legitimate the vary-
ing rates of success that result from differences in the types of preferences of
members of different conceptions of the good. This enables the state to focus
on providing a minimum amount of conception-speciﬁc goods, leaving the rest
of it to the ‘market to determine what goods will be produced and how they
will be allocated’ (ER, p. 120). This means that the market, as a civil institu-
tion free of government involvement in provision and regulation, will deter-
mine the winners and the losers of the game between competing ways of life
and conceptions of the good.
The combined role of these strategies is to satisfy the requirement of equal
opportunity for self-determination. Because neutrality is anchored in the value
of autonomy, the best way to make the state exercise of neutrality legitimate is
to equalize everyone’s opportunity to determine themselves, choose their ways
of life and bear responsibility for their consequences, leaving everything else
to the market in which individuals will freely pursue their conceptions of the
good and distribute the associated costs and beneﬁts.
This seems to imply a bifurcated conception of personal autonomy, divided
between two main parts: the external elements, represented by the range of
options, and internal elements, represented by the assumed ability of individu-
als to decide for themselves (ER, pp. 131–133). Though Patten does not say
much more about it, I will take this as sufﬁcient to indicate the rough outline
of his understanding of personal autonomy, from which I will try to deduce a
number of details.
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First, in terms of the external elements, Patten’s understanding seems to
overlap with theories suggesting that autonomy is conditioned by external fac-
tors, for example Raz’s famous view about the range of adequate options as
crucially important for autonomy, which Patten uses in the book (ER, p. 132).
On this basis, it is plausible to suggest that Patten thinks that elements external
to individuals play an important role in understanding autonomy.
However, there are two different ways to conceptualize the role of external
factors in a concept of autonomy. First, one may adopt a procedural approach,
according to which external factors are procedurally relevant for personal
autonomy because they enable individuals to be autonomous. Within this
approach, personal autonomy is taken as a feature of individuals only, while
external elements, such as the range of options, are merely conditions under
which autonomy obtains (or does not). Second, one may adopt a substantive
view, according to which external conditions are not only procedurally impor-
tant, but constitute a substantial part of what personal autonomy is. Namely,
substantive theorists believe that one cannot specify autonomy without refer-
ence to external elements, including types of personal commitments. For exam-
ple, a voluntary decision to become a slave counts as autonomous under a
procedural view as long as the individual had other options but still freely
decided to become a slave. Under a substantive view, voluntary slaves could
never be autonomous because such commitments are inimical to the meaning
of personal autonomy.
The distinction between self-determination (as individual responsibility)
and background options and choices (as institutional responsibility) suggests
that Patten adopts the procedural understanding of autonomy. This distinction
implies that the core of autonomy is solely under the control of individuals,
while the state merely provides the instruments, including freedom and the
adequate range of options. Patten believes that self-determination is the core of
what personal autonomy is all about: our ability to determine our own concep-
tion of the good life. His approach is content-neutral toward personal commit-
ments, implying that whatever individuals choose counts as autonomous
regardless of its outcomes, provided that the background conditions do not
interfere with their ability to so choose. This seems to be precisely the implica-
tion of the institutional frame Patten builds around his assumption of personal
autonomy: the duty of the state is to provide the adequate options and refrain
from interfering with individual self-determination. Neutrality of treatment, the
fair baseline and the free opportunity for self-determination are built on these
foundational assumptions about autonomy.
On this second, internal part, things are less clear. What does self-determi-
nation mean? Again, Patten gives no indication, so we have to rely on the
most plausible interpretation of his views. A bifurcated procedural theory of
autonomy is most likely to be based on a hierarchical conception of the self,
according to which persons possess a second-order (internal) self that enables
them to reﬂect on ﬁrst-order preferences (for external options available) and
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choose their own course of action (see Bratman, 2003, p. 157). Unless we
think that the choosing self does not reﬂect upon the available options, and
preferences based on them, before adopting one, this conclusion seems the
most plausible one.
In the contemporary philosophical literature this idea has been primarily
associated with Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin. Both of them have, at a
certain point, entertained the idea that autonomy is related to the second-order
desire, or the ability to assess ﬁrst-order desires and impulses from a higher
standpoint. This idea implies the following procedure: a person is autonomous
if she has a desire to have that desire, or if she has a second-order desire about
the ﬁrst-order desire and wishes that the ﬁrst order desire moves her to act. We
are autonomous to the extent that we accept and endorse one particular desire
and act upon it (Dworkin, 1988, pp. 3–21).
Although Patten does not explicitly endorse this (heavily criticized and lar-
gely abandoned) conception of autonomy, one could plausibly argue that his
theory implies it. Recall that, according to him, an individual is autonomous if
he adopts a conception of the good by choosing between the resources and
options provided by the state. Since it is assumed that persons do not adopt
any of these options directly, existence of the second-order reﬂecting self is the
logically implied autonomy mechanism. Provided with a baseline for making a
choice, individuals reﬂect upon the available options and choose preferred
ones.
If this interpretation of Patten’s conception of autonomy is correct, then this
conception falls prey to an important objection. Namely, this objection suggests
that autonomy’s content-neutrality, implied by the procedural theory, makes it
unable to account for autonomy-diminishing inﬂuences that fall through the
cracks of the procedure, and to distinguish authentic from non-authentic indi-
vidual commitments. In other words, how can we know that an individual’s
commitment to a particular option made against a procedure is authentically
hers? One could say that we do not necessarily have to care about this; as long
as external conditions are accounted for, whatever individuals decide is norma-
tively irrelevant. But, that would be incongruent with the view that autonomy
is intrinsically important. If we truly care about personal autonomy, we have
every reason to care for authenticity of autonomous choices. Implying that any
outcome of the reﬂection procedure is authentic is insufﬁcient because other
factors play a role in determining autonomous agency.
Therefore, assuming a procedural account of autonomy undermines the
plausibility of Patten’s theory. If self-determination were a feature of individu-
als by which they use the procedure of second-order reﬂection against ﬁrst-
order preferences to determine which of the available options to choose, then
the theory building on this understanding would need to ﬁnd a solution to this
problem.
In order to avoid it, Patten could adopt the substantive view of autonomy,
according to which the options individuals choose plays a constitutive role in
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deﬁning autonomy. This would mean that commitments persons adopt count as
relevant factors in establishing the authentic character of their choices. It could
help Patten defuse the criticism focused on the procedural character of the the-
ory. Thinking substantively about autonomy means accounting for the nature
of personal commitments and establishing a stronger link between personal,
psychology and chosen options. Not all preferences count as autonomous
because some violate the substantial meaning of autonomy, while others do not
necessarily reﬂect what a person would authentically choose. Therefore, a sub-
stantive approach allows for a more robust understanding of authenticity,
which helps us to account for possible autonomy-infringing external
inﬂuences.
However, opting for this strategy would open Patten’s theory to two chal-
lenges. First, the challenge that by requiring a particular substance of personal
commitments, it poses overly demanding conditions on what counts as autono-
mous and risks turning into paternalism. Second, the challenge pertaining
speciﬁcally to Patten’s theory would argue that focusing on outcomes of auton-
omous decision-making rather than procedure, moves Patten’s theory away
from its intended emphasis on neutral treatment and brings it closer to neutral-
ity of effects theory. Patten argues against neutrality conceptualized in terms of
outcomes and effects because he ﬁnds such an approach too stringent. So, sub-
stantive theory of autonomy is not an option for him.
It seems we have come to an impasse. Assuming that Patten’s approach
reﬂects the procedural understanding of autonomy, we have reasons to believe
that this understanding makes the neutrality of treatment theory a less-plausible
alternative to the competing views. This, however, does not mean that no
improvement is possible. I will review potential strategies for strengthening his
account in the last section. Before I do that, I wish to discuss another source
of problems for his approach.
Neutrality and conﬁgurations of power
In the previous section I argued that the procedural character of Patten’s
assumed theory of autonomy makes the argument regarding neutrality of
treatment vulnerable to the charge that it is unable to account for autonomy-
diminishing inﬂuences, which are not resolved by the fair baseline require-
ments outlined in the generic entanglement and evenhandedness strategies.
In order to provide this charge with more substance, in this section I will
review possible inﬂuences that diminish personal autonomy. Instead of looking
at direct and institutional constraints on free individual agency, I will focus
more on hidden conﬁgurations of power that affect the way individuals con-
ceptualize themselves, their notions of the good, and ultimately exercise their
autonomy.
Namely, I want to argue that there is a whole range of different social con-
ﬁgurations of power that is left unaccounted for by the procedural approach to
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neutrality. These conﬁgurations usually involve inherited or deeply rooted
forms of knowledge, communication and interaction that operate at formal and
informal levels of society. If unaccounted for by the design of liberal institu-
tional efforts to protect and promote personal autonomy, these forms can sig-
niﬁcantly constrain individual authenticity and autonomy in conceptualizing
their notions of the good. I distinguish three forms of conﬁgurative power:
epistemic, discursive, and structural.
Epistemic power
Epistemic power pertains to the existing systems of knowledge production, the
content of socially available knowledge paradigms and their inﬂuence on how
individuals conceptualize themselves and their notions of the good. An individ-
ual is able to become autonomous and to respond to her environment in a
reﬂective and spontaneous way only if she is socialized within an epistemic
conﬁguration that recognizes and promotes autonomous action as the main
social standard. This implies a social structure in which educational, scientiﬁc,
and regulatory systems rely on the conception of an autonomous person as the
main element of the social order. Accordingly, such a structure invests in creat-
ing conditions and resources for continuous development of individual auton-
omy, from compulsory educational programs for not-yet-autonomous
individuals to voluntary means of autonomy development, such as non-formal
education, public campaigns and information dissemination activities.
Patten’s theory seems appropriate for regulating the latter through the gen-
eric entanglement and evenhandedness strategies. These are supplementary
measures aimed at rectifying mistakes and shortcomings in the privatization
strategy. For example, generic entanglement implies recognizing that certain
provisions are crucial for all conceptions of the good – such as basic liberties
and primary goods – which would justify state interventions directed at their
promotion (ER, p. 119).
However, the generic entanglement and evenhandedness strategies only go
so far in enabling individuals to determine their conceptions of the good with-
out checking the interplay between various individuals and groups, and the
effect of their unconstrained relations to each other’s autonomy. As a result of
the privatization strategy, which aims at leaving individuals with a private
space (the market) in which to play out their preferences, the approach has no
means of regulating the imbalance between more and less powerful agents, and
the effect of this imbalance on less powerful ones. Patten does suggest that the
state has a general responsibility to ‘limit the negative externalities imposed by
one person’s or group’s behavior on others’ (ER, p. 120), but does not offer a
more detailed argument about the ways these externalities limit individual
autonomy and the strategies for addressing them.
The epistemic conﬁguration of power is often at play in informal systems
of knowledge production, exchange and dissemination, such as different
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(cultural) forms of understanding and interpreting the human condition. Unlike
the formal systems, which could aim at developing personal autonomy – such
as secular education – the informal conﬁgurations of epistemic power are pri-
marily oriented around goals of group and cultural continuity, although they
may pronounce a general respect for individual autonomy. Think of certain
religious groups who live in liberal polities and espouse a perfunctory respect
for autonomy of their members, yet sustain narratives, customs and forms of
child-rearing that indirectly work against the long-term (dispositional, rather
than episodic) autonomy of their members. The question that needs to be
posed is: to what extent are their preferences for religious ways of life authen-
tic, and therefore, autonomous? Assuming that provisions within the fair base-
line do not tackle associational (sub-state) practices, what gives us reason and
assurance that commitments chosen from within these cultural positions are
truly autonomous?
If we leave individual choice of conceptions of the good to the marketplace
of ideas and prevent institutions from limiting their opportunities for self-deter-
mination, we have accounted for only one possible source of constraint on
individual authenticity and autonomy. The other source, represented by various
cultural norms of knowledge production and dissemination – such as tradi-
tional narratives, cultural and religious beliefs that are not unworthy of neutral
treatment – is left completely free from regulation. This would not be a prob-
lem had these sources not been disproportionately more powerful than individ-
ual persons who live under them.
Discursive power
Discursive power is latent in prevailing modes of modern communication,
including the availability of communicative channels, forms of communicative
agency and the character of permissible discourses. It is conﬁgured by the
ways in which public communication takes place, the social presence of media
and its responsiveness to different social groups. It often ﬁnds expression in
the frames of representation of social groups, which bind the scope of public
discourse.
These conﬁgurations signiﬁcantly affect the development of a capability for
individual autonomy, and shape the character of individual conceptions of the
good. Take for example the existing discourses about the human body,
imposed on public sphere by market-driven forces, such as magazines, adver-
tising and television. The dominant image of a desirable male and female body
exerts discursive power over the ways persons conceptualize themselves and
their values. Individuals cannot form authentic bodily self-perceptions and
develop authentic notions of the good pertaining to the human body if there is
a great asymmetry in the public conﬁguration of discourses where the balance
is skewed to beneﬁt more powerful agents. This is not a question about the
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‘worthiness’ of this (or any other) conception of the good, but the question of
its authenticity to the person adopting it.
In such circumstances, the character of public discourse will be signiﬁ-
cantly limited and will allow for only a narrow range of permissible individual
expression, crucially important for development of autonomy. The body image
example is important because it indicates that permissiveness of public dis-
course is not necessarily dictated by state institutions, but by informal patterns
of the market-based culture, speech and social interaction. If communicative
agency is constrained by these patterns and interactions, it will not allow for
spontaneous creation of information sources and exchange networks, and indi-
viduals will have difﬁculties shaping their authentic selves through develop-
ment of alternative discourses.
Therefore, liberal institutions must make sure that there are no market con-
straints on the availability of alternative communicative channels, diverse com-
municative roles or permissible discourses, and also work actively toward their
establishment. The exercise of neutrality against autonomous individuals needs
to be conditioned by this requirement.
Structural power
Besides epistemic and discursive conﬁgurations of power, personal autonomy
is also affected by other forms of social structure, such as deep-rooted struc-
tural inequalities, reﬂected through skewed architecture of different conceptions
of the good. The concern for structural inequality surrounding conceptions of
the good parallels similar efforts in social and political philosophy to theorize
ways in which personal autonomy is limited, from Foucauldian emphases on
structurally dispersed forms of power to critical republicanism, espoused by
writers such as Cécile Laborde or Philip Pettit (see Foucault, 1980; Laborde,
2008, p. 168; Pettit, 2002). Similarly to feminist critics, republican philoso-
phers have criticized liberal theories of neutrality and suggested we should
worry about hidden forms of domination and look not only at state institutions
but also at non-state actors and practices as sources that limit individual free-
dom and autonomy (see Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). This understanding
builds on Pettit’s distinction between two classical models of domination,
drawn from Roman law: imperium, the arbitrary power exercised by the state
and its agents; and dominium, the arbitrary power exercised by private and col-
lective persons in society. By suggesting that we should worry about relations
of domination in individuals’ public and private lives, in formal and informal
settings, Pettit joins other critics of liberalism in ‘expanding the scope of the
political to the spheres long considered to be immune from public scrutiny,
notably the family, the workplace and religious groups’ (Laborde, 2008,
p. 151).
Complementing the concern with different forms of conﬁgurative power,
the concern for structural domination implies that liberal institutions must
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address the character of those spheres of social life that are usually off the lib-
eral agenda. These include not only communal norms and rituals of minorities
(from cultural groups to families) that may directly frame individual options,
but also assumptions and background practices of the majority that are fre-
quently outside the institutional purview, including most notably, the market.
Structural domination, however, does not necessarily have to be expressed
in terms of imperium or dominium. It can be formed in a way less centered on
deﬁnable subjects and objects (individuals and structures) but organized as a
center-less architecture of policy choices presented to individuals by institutions
or the market. Through empirical examples and theoretical discussion, Richard
Thaler and Cass Sunstein have persuasively shown that the way different
options are organized affects the way individuals choose: the display pattern of
different meals in the school restaurant, for example, signiﬁcantly affects the
way students decide what they will eat for lunch (Sunstein & Thaler, 2008,
pp. 2–3). They suggest that there is no neutral choice architecture. Every orga-
nization of choices necessarily affects the way individuals choose.
If this premise is accepted (there are some reservations, see Coons &
Weber, 2013, p. 23) it implies that in cases where there are two or more con-
testable goods to be chosen, the way these goods are organized in the market
sphere matters. Some patterns of organization appeal more to individual
affective inclinations and encourage unreﬂective and non-spontaneous deci-
sion-making, while others require more demanding levels of reﬂection and
spontaneity. If individual choice depends on the structural organization of con-
testable goods, liberal institutions must ensure that this organization reﬂects the
good of autonomy. In other words, institutions should shape the architecture of
choices (conceptions of the good) in a way that prevents hidden structural
domination and supports reﬂective decision-making. This requires intervention
into the market instead of exercising simple neutrality to outcomes of private
interplay between individuals.
A way forward: substantive neutrality
The aim of the preceding discussion was merely to indicate two potential prob-
lems in Patten’s theory of neutrality, rather than to provide a detailed elabora-
tion. While far from exhaustive, I believe it is still sufﬁcient to set up a
backdrop for addressing some issues with Patten’s, otherwise important and
persuasive, theory of neutrality. So, how to improve this theory in such a way
that some of the issues hitherto discussed are resolved and the value of neutral-
ity is preserved? To understand the problem more precisely, and to formulate
plausible solutions, it is useful to distinguish between two general approaches
to liberal neutrality.
The ﬁrst approach is procedural. It touts neutrality in terms of government
impartiality to individual choices. It can be justiﬁed in a number of ways, one
of which is the autonomy-based justiﬁcation, which argues that the principle of
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neutrality is anchored in the value of autonomy. This approach assumes that
state provision of fair opportunity for autonomy warrants the exercise of impar-
tial (neutral) treatment toward the outcomes of individual choices. Let us bor-
row vocabulary from Rawls and call this a form of pure procedural neutrality
(Rawls, 1999). This implies that besides the procedure of individual choice
against the background of a fair baseline, there exist no other criteria for what
constitutes an autonomous conception of the good. Therefore, if we value
autonomy, we ought to be neutral toward autonomous individual choices and
conceptions.
One problem with this understanding of neutrality is that the procedure
itself may be inadequately conceptualized. As I argued in the previous sec-
tions, establishing the fair baseline through generic provisions and balancing
efforts may still be insufﬁcient to account for various conﬁgurations of power
that manage to curtail personal autonomy through informal and hidden struc-
tures.
The second approach is substantial. There is a strong and a weak variant of
this approach. Under the strong variant, the problem with the procedural theory
is that regardless of how the procedure is designed, it will be insufﬁcient to
predict personal autonomy because other (substantive) criteria will be more rel-
evant. These criteria could be associated with the nature of personal commit-
ments: some of them could be inimical to the meaning of autonomy, so the
impartiality-based approach will lack the means to address them. For example,
a person may choose a subordinate way of life despite the availability of other
options and access to the same generic types of opportunity for self-determina-
tion, such as education and similar goods. The scenario is all too well known:
many women in societies that are procedurally neutral do seem to adopt social
positions that are subordinate to men. Following feminist criticisms of liberal
conceptions of autonomy, the strong substantial approach considers such com-
mitments unworthy because they violate the meaning of autonomy.
Under the weak variant, the problem is that the procedure itself is not sen-
sitive enough to alternative (informal and hidden) ways in which personal
commitments are constrained by various power sources. While it does focus
on the ends (the commitments) rather than the procedure, this approach does
not reject the possibility that the substance of personal commitments can be
made more autonomous by interventions into the procedure, rather than judg-
ing the worthiness and constraining the character of individual commitments.
The neutrality of treatment is a form of pure procedural neutrality. Two of
its most serious problems, as discussed in earlier sections, are a consequence
of that form. However, I believe that the way forward for this theory lies not
in rejecting the procedural character of the approach in the way the strong vari-
ant of the substantial approach would suggest, but rather in adopting the weak
substantial strategy and formulating a set of indirect constraints on personal
commitments as a partial improvement of the theory. The aim of this strategy
would be the preservation of the valuable institutional neutrality toward
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individual choices and the establishment of stronger guarantees that commit-
ments are as authentic and autonomous as possible.
This would require several amendments to Patten’s original proposal. First,
it would require a more elaborate development of the underlying theory of
autonomy. Second, it would require expansion of the fair baseline strategy
through additions aimed at accounting for the hidden conﬁgurations of power.
In the remainder of this paper, I will brieﬂy outline some guidelines for these
strategies.
In terms of autonomy, the way forward does not necessarily demand rejec-
tion of the substantive theory, according to which the character of individual
commitments is relevant for establishing a person’s autonomy. Thankfully,
some substantive theorists have offered other ways in which Patten could
express concern with the outcomes of individual decisions and still preserve
the procedural nature of his theory of neutrality. Namely, he could choose to
follow the weak substantivist approach that places indirect, rather than direct,
constraints upon the nature of individual commitments (Kristinsson, 2000,
pp. 257–286). For example, he could argue that persons exercise autonomy
when they assume social positions that enable them to have regulative control
over the direction of their life, and the commitments they choose (see Oshana,
2005, p. 183). This would enable persons to manage certain key aspects of
their lives not only against government institutions, but also against other per-
sons who might attempt to wield some form of control over them (Oshana,
2006, p. 84). This means that persons are autonomous not only when there is
a fair institutional background to their self-determination, but also when they
are in a position to engage and ﬁght off other possible challenges to control
over their commitments (Benson, 2005, p. 125; also Westlund, 2009, pp. 26–
49).
This also implies conceptualizing autonomy in terms of individual ability
and access to opportunities to change or to reject their conceptions of the good.
To count as autonomous, conceptions of the good must not be socially ﬁxed.
Persons should be free and have the means to amend their commitments and
to act in accordance with the change without grave consequences. This does
not render the question of responsibility for one’s commitments irrelevant. Cer-
tainly, individuals must bear the costs of their autonomous commitments, but
what often happens is that the market costs of a prospective change of commit-
ment often prevent individuals from authentically changing or rejecting them,
which brings the autonomous nature of their current commitments under
question.
Having the means and opportunities for change implies not only existence
of information about different conceptions of the good, but also of meaningful
and viable opportunities for change. These requirements constrain the authority
of other participants in social interaction and render the role of government
institutions crucial: while they are not justiﬁed in forcing individuals in or out
of any conception of the good, they must make sure individuals retain the right
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11
and opportunity for change and exit. This right is best served by government
interventions into the market where the interaction between and within particu-
lar conceptions of the good takes place. Government must do more than sim-
ply provide a fair background for individual self-determination: it must
intervene in the formation of different conceptions of the good and make sure
that their adherents are not coerced by implicit (epistemic, discursive or struc-
tural) means into endorsing ways of life they would otherwise authentically
reject or amend.
If we assume that Patten would endorse this expansion of the conception
of autonomy, how would that affect his theory of neutrality as neutral treat-
ment? Would it endanger some of its main postulates?
Not necessarily. We have good reason to grant Patten the idea that the best
way to respect personal autonomy involves government provision of fair
opportunities for self-determination and its simultaneous impartiality to the
conceptions of the good individuals choose against the background of such
provision. However, it would require expansion of the fair baseline provisions
with an additional strategy aimed at correcting the power imbalances that result
from the free interplay between individuals and conceptions of the good in the
civil sector.
We could call this the balancing strategy, and it would imply government
interventions in two domains: First, within the conceptions of the good, by
way of making sure that individuals have the means and opportunities to
change or reject their conceptions of the good without having to pay high costs
that usually come with an exit from certain ways of life. Also, the governments
should ensure that the character of particular conceptions of the good does not
negatively affect the ability of individuals to reﬂect upon them and act in
accordance to that reﬂection, either at changing the conceptions’ character or
by rejecting them completely. Second, governments should also regulate inter-
action between different conceptions of the good, by way of ensuring that no
particular conception exerts limiting inﬂuence on any other through amassed
epistemic, discursive or structural power. Individuals with less powerful con-
ceptions of the good should not bear responsibility for the imbalance of power
between his and other conceptions if that imbalance affects his personal auton-
omy. The balancing strategy is different from the evenhandedness strategy,
though they share the same narrow aim. While the evenhandedness is concep-
tualized as primarily a resource-based strategy focused on equalizing the hard
power between different conceptions of the good, the balancing approach is
more focused on the underlying relations of domination and inequality, the soft
power both within and between different conceptions.
If it is grounded in the principle of autonomy, liberal neutrality cannot be
purely procedural. The tools of the fair baseline must be broadened to include
additional substantive guarantees that the conceptions of the good individuals
are committed to being as authentic and autonomous as possible. This is a sub-
stantive theory of liberal neutrality, conceptualized weakly not through direct
12 E. Sarajlić
constraints on personal commitments but through indirect means of ensuring
their autonomous character. It implies that neutrality of treatment should not be
only about resources available to persons so they could freely determine their
selves, but also about power relations that exert a similar inﬂuence on the
opportunity for personal self-determination.
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